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FOREWORD
On August 1– 5, 2005, the Center for Stabilization and Reconstruction Studies 
(CSRS) conducted the first in what will be a series of educational games 
addressing challenges associated with stabilization and reconstruction 
operations.  This report documents that Game, entitled “Humanitarian 
Operations During Conflict,” which brought together representatives who deal 
with humanitarian relief from non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs)/international organizations (IOs), US government civilian agencies, and 
the US military, to explore possibilities for cooperation in the delivery of relief 
assistance in conflict zones. 
The Game was conducted by CSRS in close collaboration with Ambassador
Carlos Pascual, the Coordinator of the Office for Reconstruction and Stabilization 
at the US Department of State (S/CRS).  Ambassador Pascual and his team at 
S/CRS participated in the development of the game topic, worked with CSRS on 
selecting game participants, and participated in the event.
The Game was also endorsed by the United States Institute of Peace (USIP), 
which has worked closely with CSRS since the Center’s creation.  In January 
2005, CSRS partnered with USIP and several other organizations in the 
development of a workshop entitled “Humanitarian Roles in Insecure 
Environments.”  USIP has subsequently been hosting a working group focused 
on the relationships between armed forces and NGOs, and was very helpful in 
the development and promotion of the Game. 
Ambassador Pascual, Congressman Sam Farr -- who has been instrumental in the 
creation of this center -- Robert Ord, Dean of the School of International 
Graduate Studies here at the Naval Postgraduate School and Richard Hoffman, 
Director of the Center for Civil-Military Relations also at the Naval Postgraduate, 
School provided strategic guidance and encouragement to launch this Game.
Our team and the Game participants appreciate their leadership.  I would like to 
thank the members of the CSRS team that came together to conduct this event: 
Nick Tomb, John Christiansen, Roy Brennan, Jeff Lewis, Eric Papayoanou, and 
Sean Casey each provided invaluable contributions. 
We have attempted to glean, synthesize, and organize various insights and 
points of view that emerged during the Game within this report.  Certainly, this 
report is unable to precisely and fully explain or represent the views of any one 
of our participants.  However, it is my hope that we have captured herein 
information that will be useful to practitioners, policy analysts, and researchers.
While this written report is valuable and will serve as a source document and 
reference for each of the communities of the participants, we found it difficult to 
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capture and reflect the tremendous amount of learning and insights that 
occurred during the Game.  Hence, this report is a poor substitute for actual 
participation in the event.  In the future we will explore additional means and 
audio/visual tools to make our events available to a broader audience. 
Finally, I would like to thank all of the individuals and organizations that 
participated in CSRS’s first educational game, contributing to the success of the 
event.  And, appreciation is due to RADM Dunne, President of the Naval 
Postgraduate School, whose leadership has promoted this type of innovative 
education.  We plan on hosting many more educational events, and look forward 
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The fifteen years since 1990 have brought dramatic shifts in international affairs. 
Unfortunately, the end of the Cold War did not usher in an era of peace and 
stability, as many had hoped.  Twice since 1991, the US has found itself 
embroiled in conflicts in Iraq, and has deployed its armed forces, either
independently or with international partners, on multiple occasions.
Almost non-existent during the late twentieth century, complex humanitarian 
missions involving United States assets are now becoming common.  As affected 
leaders begin to absorb the challenges presented by this new dynamic, they have 
begun calling for closer coordination and stronger training relationships between 
armed forces and humanitarian communities.  At the same time, the
relationships between these communities often remain tense.
In the summer of 2005, the Center for Stabilization and Reconstruction Studies 
(CSRS) at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California hosted a 
strategic and operational game designed to address the challenges of 
humanitarian relief during conflict.  In attendance were representatives from the 
US government, nongovernmental organizations, the United Nations and other 
international organizations. 
The Game focused on the operational and strategic challenges inherent in 
providing humanitarian aid in an unstable environment.  The Game was 
composed of three scenarios, and while it was a role-playing simulation, 
participants assumed their real-world roles: representatives of the armed forces,
government civilians, international organizations (IOs) and non-governmental
organizations (NGOs).
The Game’s first scenario opened with a humanitarian crisis beset by localized 
violence.  The second scenario addressed the provision of relief in a combat 
environment, and the third concerned a transitional, immediate post-conflict 
stage wherein a multinational force is giving way to a United Nations 
peacekeeping force while humanitarian operations continue.
Participants developed the following findings and recommendations:
x Cooperation and effective joint planning in complex environments are 
frustrated by an entrenched culture of secrecy and mistrust.  This culture 
exists in varying degrees within all institutions, and at all levels.  While 
participants advocated a collective commitment toward a “culture of 
sharing,” it is not yet clear how such a shift will be accomplished. 
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x In environments in which the US armed forces are simultaneously 
providing security and stability and also helping to support humanitarian 
activities, NGOs face serious threats to their perceived neutrality, which is 
perhaps the most essential asset they posses during such missions. 
Recommendations in this area focused on in-depth planning from the
outset, to allow for neutral meeting locations under United Nations 
leadership.
x Many actors, particularly at the operational level, are unaware of the 
needs and capabilities of other agencies, creating both gaps and overlaps
in operations.  This is seen as an outgrowth of the inadequate information 
sharing procedures currently in place and/or of the failure of operational 
leaders to employ them.
x Inadequate policy coordination between humanitarian and government 
agencies at the top level filters down through the system and serves to 
impede operational coordination on the ground.
x Humanitarian organizations, particularly NGOs, are inadequately and/or 
improperly funded for some tasks they must perform in complex crises. 
Intensive planning, information sharing and task division are iterative, 
ongoing processes that require trained and devoted staff.  The armed 
forces generally have the training mechanisms and the personnel in place 
to handle these responsibilities; more needs to be done by civilian 
governmental and non-governmental organizations to educate
donors/funding entities about these staffing needs. 
x While inter-agency planning is a consistent challenge, it represents a 
singular opportunity to improve humanitarian operations during crisis.
Because effective cooperation is largely informal and personality-driven,
the planning process provides an opportunity to develop and build 
relationships of trust between organizations where historically, little has 
existed at the institution-to-institution level.
x More than any other single commitment, a shift to greater operational 
transparency would improve coordination and planning among 
organizations.  To this end, participants highlighted the need to be 
forthcoming with information both within the communities involved in 
humanitarian activities and with the local populations/authorities to the 
maximum extent possible.  Common practices such as classifying all 
information and remaining vague about operations must give way to 
greater cooperation.
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OVERVIEW, OBJECTIVES AND GAME PLAY
“Humanitarian Operations During Conflict” was designed to explore the 
dynamics at work within and among the communities responsible for delivery of 
humanitarian assistance.  Bringing together representatives of the United States 
armed forces, US governmental civilian agencies, non-governmental 
organizations, the United Nations and other international organizations, CSRS 
aimed to address several formal objectives:
x Examination of the major issues associated with provision of 
humanitarian assistance during conflict.
x Exploration of motivations, biases, values and other cultural 
characteristics of the main stakeholders who provide assistance during 
conflict.
x Assessment of the necessity for any and/or all relevant parties to 
significantly change their approaches and general operational 
assumptions in order to improve humanitarian operations.
The challenges of inter-agency cooperation, particularly among organizations
with such varied institutional cultures as those present in humanitarian 
operations, are not new.  As changing geopolitical realities have begun to bring 
the government, armed forces and humanitarian communities into more 
frequent partnership, CSRS believes that bringing experienced officials together 
to simulate potential challenges is a key element in assuring future success.
Role-playing simulations serve as a form of practice, where obstacles both 
human and technological can be identified and, hopefully, overcome.  In 
“Humanitarian Operations During Conflict,” CSRS facilitators provided a 
context and structure which encouraged participants to engage as they would in 
a real-world situation.
Game Play 
The Game centered on a progressively deteriorating humanitarian crisis in the 
fictional country of Aliya.  As the scenario opens, humanitarian organizations 
and the United Nations have been present in Aliya for years as a result of 
drought and famine exacerbated by a protracted civil war.  Increased levels of 
violence in the country created an environment where humanitarian assistance 
could not be provided safely or effectively.  The situation had deteriorated to 
such an extent that some of the UN and humanitarian agencies were considering 
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withdrawing.  In response to the increased violence and burgeoning crisis, the 
UN Security Council authorized the use of force to establish peace and to 
support the humanitarian efforts.
The situation in Aliya evolved as the game progressed through three “moves,” 
each of which cast participants as representatives of their organizations in one of 
three inter-agency working groups.
Game move scenarios were as follows:
Move I: Humanitarian Assistance
Move I was a humanitarian situation in an insecure environment requiring 
military support.  The humanitarian need results mostly from a natural 
disaster and on-going, low-level internal conflict/civil war.  Delivery of 
humanitarian assistance is complicated by both the insecurity of the country 
and the inaccessibility of the target beneficiaries. 
Move II: Conflict
Move II was a conflict situation wherein the multinational force (MNF) is a 
belligerent.  The MNF is composed of armed forces contributions from 
countries whose governments are the primary donors for humanitarian aid.
Although need existed prior to the arrival of the MNF, the most acute needs 
are now related to security operations. 
Move III: Transition and Recovery
Move III transitions from the militarily proactive presence of the MNF in 
Move II toward a more traditional peacekeeping role for the MNF.  While the 
environment has become more secure, the changing roles of various actors 
complicate successful delivery of aid. 
Information Sharing, Joint Planning, Task Division 
Small groups (the “inter-agency working groups”) were organized around 
Information Sharing, Joint Planning and Task Division.  Participants rotated 
among the groups, with each participant spending one move in each group.
In each move, the groups met to discuss priorities and respond to a series of 
questions and challenges put to them by facilitators; all groups reported back to 
the larger cohort at the end of each move, where the facilitators led the room in a 
further round of questioning and assessing the challenges posed by each task.
[Note:  in order to encourage a free-flowing exchange of ideas, all dialogue 




The seemingly endless cycle of violence and suffering in Aliya had reached a 
defining moment.  Following three years of drought, government forces were 
determined to rout insurgents from their remaining strongholds and had raised
the level of violence substantially.  Humanitarian organizations, many of which 
had been in-country for over a decade, could no longer safely provide aid; most 
were considering withdrawal from Aliya.  Further complicating matters, the 
United Nations Security Council authorized an MNF to establish a secure 
environment by forceful means, if necessary, and the MNF was in the process of 
arriving.  The MNF strategy was to avoid the use of force, if possible, and 
provide assistance to the humanitarian agencies.  Many observers were hopeful 
that the MNF would be successful, that violence would recede, and that the 
conditions would allow resumption of regular humanitarian activity in Aliya. 
Map of Fictitious Country of Aliya 
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Participants were provided with background materials, readings and related 
policy documents and UN resolutions.  [Note:  these documents are part of the 
game material package provided to each participant.]  After an overview in the 
morning plenary session, they were divided into working groups tasked with 
working through the general areas of Information Sharing, Joint Planning (the 
term applies to planning among the various agencies present in Aliya and is not 
used in the military sense) and Task Division. 
MOVE II
The MNF had limited success in providing support for the provision of 
humanitarian assistance and, due to the continuing needs in Aliya, the UN 
Security Council and troop contributing nations agreed to extend the duration of 
the force and adopt a more aggressive military posture.  Early in the spring, 
consistent clashes between the Tormund and the Northern Alliance resulting in 
small territorial loses by the Tormund.  Many of the Tormund believed the losses 
were caused by covert MNF support of the Northern Alliance.  By mid-June, 
extensive violence erupted between the Tormund and the MNF, with ongoing 
clashes for the remainder of the month.  The Northern Alliance used this 
opportunity to capitalize on the tension between the MNF and the Tormund by 
launching a major offensive on 4 July.  By 9 July, the Tormund lost much of its 
territory in the North and all of its gains in the Northeastern part of the country. 
The Northern Alliance entered Mahuka on 19 July and the capital of Aliya, 
Kahoma, on 22 July.
The heightened instability in the nation caused the UN and most of the IO/NGO 
community to withdraw their international staff to Palolo and Imin for 
consultations and planning.  The largest meetings were held in Palolo from 5 - 9 
July which resulted in a 90-day operational plan.  Some UN and NGO staff 
returned to the Northeastern and Northern Regions, but most were not able to 
return.  In the remaining areas of the country, NGOs and the local staff of 
international IO/NGOs were conducting some humanitarian assistance.
Game play:  a high-level inter-agency meeting is taking place regarding the 
current situation in Aliya.  Representatives from the international donor, armed 
forces, and humanitarian communities are all participating.  Working Sub-
groups have been formed to address certain critical components for provision of 
humanitarian assistance to the Aliyans.  The 90-Day Plan and a memo written by 
the UN Humanitarian Coordinator on Relations with Military Forces have been 
provided, as well as the pre-game readings.  [Note:  these game materials were 
provided to each participant of the Game.]  The documents were used for 
background and resource references. 
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MOVE III 
Since mid-2005, the Northern Alliance had made extensive political and military 
gains.  After seizing the capitol city of Kahoma in July, the Northern Alliance,
over a period of several months, managed to gain control of the territory of 
Aliya, except in areas where scattered pockets of Tormund resistance occurred.
The majority of these were in the Eastern and Southern Regions.
In order to gain wider international political recognition, the leaders of the 
Northern Alliance on 10 November formed an Interim Administration.  The 
stated intention of the Interim Administration was to guide the country towards
a representative civilian form of government.  The administration was formally 
recognized on 2 December by the US Government and the US Embassy was re-
staffed in Kahoma.
 On 14 November, the UN Security Council authorized a UN Force (Blue 
Helmeted) under Chapter VII to replace the UN authorized MNF.   On 8 
December, the UN Security Council recognizes the need for support of the 
Interim Administration and called for its’ support by the international 
community.
Game play:  an inter-agency meeting is taking place regarding the current 
situation in Kahoma.  Representatives from the international donor, military, and
humanitarian communities are all participating.  Working Sub-groups have been 
formed to address certain critical components for provision of humanitarian 
assistance to the Aliyans.  The UN Security Council Resolution recognizing the 




Information Sharing: Priorities, Insights and Recommendations
“ In the real world, at least in my experience, 
there’s a lot more information than any one group has 
access to –- or is even aware of –- because nobody is 
taking the responsibility for sharing that 
information. Maybe you’ll see it, maybe you won’t. And 
that, I think, is the real problem. ”
Participant Observation 
“ Humanitarian Operations During Conflict ”
INFORMATION SHARING: MOVE I 
Information Sharing, in the context of this Game, refers to facilitating and 
managing the flow of information throughout the affected communities of 
humanitarian actors.  It should be noted that, in addition to the NGOs,
government organizations and armed forces that are part of the international
effort, local groups (e.g., belligerents, internally displaced persons, and local 
officials) as well as the international media are all players in the information 
sharing process.  Game participants were posed a series of questions that asked
them to prioritize and plan for the collection, management and sharing of 
various types of information necessary to facilitate the success of the mission in 
Aliya.
Participants developed a distinction between information sharing which is the 
actual passing of information among actors and information planning.
Information planning is a more fundamental task that identifies what pieces of 
information are needed, who will collect the data and analyze it to create 
valuable information, and to whom such information would be shared based on 
agency roles in the given situation.  This type of information planning is linked
to and somewhat inseparable from the tasks of the other two workgroups (Joint 
Planning and Task Division).  For example, it is the division of tasks among 
agencies that drives what type of information is needed and should be shared 
with each agency.  While this observation may appear benign, it raised a key 
point stressed by participants in all three groups: “successful interagency 
cooperation must be an iterative process, in which all players continually divide 
tasks, plan activities and share information, allowing new information and 
changing dynamics to become integrated into the process as they are absorbed.” 
The group agreed that in the early stages of the Aliya crisis, the US State 
Department would facilitate information sharing between the communities.
This would be done using the State Department’s Humanitarian Information 
Unit, which could be tasked with establishing a web portal or website available 
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to all agencies.   The political, contextual and operational information possessed 
by NGOs and other agencies already on the ground would be shared with the 
MNF as part of an ongoing dialogue that would serve to launch the information 
sharing process.  Initially, it was agreed, the State Department would take the 
lead to integrate the knowledge of NGOs on the ground with the incoming MNF, 
but over time, information sharing would move away from the US Government 
and toward the United Nations, which would be a more acceptable broker to 
many humanitarian agencies.
The group discussed the importance 
of a Humanitarian Coordinator under
the UN Special Representative to the 
Secretary General (SRSG) and 
preferred to mandate that NGOs 
cooperate with the Coordinator as a 
proxy for other agencies on the 
ground.  That established, it was clear 
that inter-agency meetings including 
representatives of NGOs, the armed 
forces and governments would continue in some form throughout this period. 
The key to making these relationships function effectively is a commitment to 
transparency by all parties.  It was noted that while some information must 
necessarily be withheld there are great risks inherent in protecting any but the
most vital information.  Local belligerents have little trouble exploiting the faults 
that open between international agencies when information sharing is less than 
optimal.  As the military and NGOs are necessarily engaged in negotiations (for 
access, permissions, etc) with local actors, they risk “being played against each 
other,” as one participant put it, when they are ignorant of each other’s activities.
This concern led to discussion of the importance of including representatives
with operational knowledge in inter-agency meetings.  Too often, the group 
agreed, these meetings are staffed by public affairs officials who are ill-equipped 
to respond to the information needs of other agencies simply because of a lack of 
operational knowledge, or, in the case of the military, by a lack of authority (real
or perceived) to divulge information they do possess.
INFORMATION SHARING: MOVE II
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The Information Sharing group -- a different cohort from Move I given the 
Game’s rotation of participants into different working groups each day -- chose 
to re-examine their roles and missions in Move I because it had not previously 
been accomplished.  They then looked at changes in those roles given the 
evolution of events in the scenario and decided that while the mission had not 
changed, organizational responsibilities had.
Donor participation was seen as a key variable at this stage.  Donors must be 
encouraged to take a more active role in explicit support of information sharing
by directly funding these requirements.  NGOs in particular are hamstrung by 
funding priorities and must improve fundraising efforts to better capitalize this 
critical aspect of humanitarian relief.
Institutional culture can also be an impediment to successful information 
sharing, particularly in an environment where humanitarians must rely on an 
MNF that has become a belligerent. Despite widely-discussed gaps in 
technology and methodology, the group identified culture (and cultural 
“baggage”) as the primary impediment to successful information management. 
Given that so much information sharing occurs on an informal, personal level 
(i.e., outside formal channels), a good deal of its success is determined by individual
commitments to leave past frictions aside and establish a culture of sharing.
There was extensive discussion of what information agencies can or would be 
willing to share. Information sharing, the group suggested, is best understood as a 
symbiotic relationship between the needs or requirements of a given stakeholder and its
perception of the support provided to it by others.
The evolving situation in Aliya might mean that, given their different mandates, 
some significant parties might well be unable to participate in a center which 
included the MNF.  For that reason, the group recommended a second 
information center be established that would share information with the MNF-
included center thereby providing a means to pass information between NGOs 
and the MNF without a direct connection. 
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INFORMATION SHARING: MOVE III
This group -- having spent the previous two days discussing other issues -- 
believed that Information Sharing was the most challenging of the three breakout 
tasks, principally because so many historical and institutional barriers exist in 
this area and because without successful information sharing, prospects for 
successful completion of the humanitarian mission are bleak. 
Like the previous two days’ participants, this group agreed that prioritizing 
donor participation was critical due to the current resource deficit.  The group 
felt that no matter what type of information sharing system was put in place, 
personnel and fiscal support would need to be directly supported through 
funding.  Given that a large part of information sharing is know-how, which is 
directly reliant upon the appropriate staff, proper funding is essential to have the 
right personnel in place.  Although lack of technology does present some 
problems, particularly for NGOs, many of these are a result of funding and 
resources; appropriate and necessary technology is available in the marketplace.
Participants spent a good deal of time discussing information sharing 
architecture.  While databases and other potential clearinghouses for information 
already exist, the challenge is to make those resources available to all 
organizations.  Some argued for a centralized information system with a single 
official responsible, but no one in the group could agree on which one, or what
such a system would look like.  Others stated that “Cadillac,” or overly 
ambitious, solutions usually fail on the operational level, and that centralized
control of information would lead to too many gaps in participation.
The group discussed the need for various databases and information sources to 
be linked via a single portal, two main functions of which would be to provide 
links to the other detailed databases, with a second portal to do trend analysis for 
operational and strategic decision makers.  After much discussion, the group 
settled on a decentralized network of information management systems and an 
overall portal in one location that can link up to the network, plus a fusion cell
that would provide public, macro analysis so decision makers could see the 
trends.
An area of significant friction concerned the verification of shared data.  While all 
participants agreed that their agencies would require verification and would be 
unable to take information from other agencies at face value, they also 
(paradoxically, perhaps) shared a sense of frustration that their agencies’ data 
would not be trusted by the others.  There was also an acknowledgement of the 
reality that timing and circumstances often do not allow for adequate verification 
processes.  No tangible solution to these issues was identified. 
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Overall the group felt that the systems that work best were the ones that were 
perceived as useful by the system users.  A key question for those developing 
systems and methodologies in the future will be how to capture and hold the
users’ interest and encourage their participation in an efficient and effective 
manner.
Persistent Challenges 
Armed forces, humanitarian and governmental officials alike are quick to agree 
that information sharing in a rapidly changing conflict environment represents 
perhaps the greatest challenge to operational success.  While perspectives vary, 
several key and persistent problems were identified by participants in the Move I 
Information Sharing Group as areas of focus for all agencies in preparing for 
future crises:
1. The primary challenge is the preeminence of cultural differences and institutional
baggage in inter-agency relations.  Organic differences in values and 
experience between humanitarian and armed forces cultures threatens the 
environment of trust that is essential to successful cooperation in all areas, 
and perhaps in information sharing most of all.
2. The armed forces’ tendency is to automatically classify, and therefore restrict, 
information as secret once that information has been consolidated or analyzed, 
regardless of content.  In turn, many NGOs withhold information from 
other agencies based on their desire to retain the perception of neutrality.
It must be stressed that while much of this discussion focused on the 
military, and representatives of the armed forces were present and were 
among the most vocal in pointing to the problem, it was agreed that all 
agencies must commit to moving in the direction of transparency in 
information sharing.
3. There were institutional biases among all actors about divulging information on 
a need-to-know basis only.  Armed forces and NGO representatives alike 
employ internal processes to determine what information is releasable to 
other organizations, and when.
4. In most organizations, regardless of which community, there are sufficient
numbers of personnel dedicated to information analysis and sharing.  Several 
participants indicated that this problem stems from poor prioritizing in 
the funding processes of various agencies; donors and government 
agencies need to raise their priority on this staffing requirement.
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5. Information sharing tends to deteriorate over time during any campaign due to 
human and institutional frustration with the inherently imbalanced flow and 
quality of information between officials and agencies.  This was termed by one 
participant the “we’re not getting anything out of this” problem.
6. Information sharing decisions are often made at the top of organizations (i.e., at 
the headquarters level) whereas information is usually collected at the field level.
Headquarters in general (whether from government or NGO 
communities) often have broader agendas beyond the specific emergency. 
These broader agendas may complicate information sharing.  One NGO 
official described a common scenario in which information was divulged 
in meetings with armed forces personnel, only to have the military official 
later retroactively classify the information, effectively removing it from 
further civilian-military exchanges.
Potential Solutions 
The group ultimately addressed the central challenge of articulating an optimal,
efficient and effective information sharing arrangement, the components of 
which are as follows: 
1. A culture of sharing.  The entire community of actors in humanitarian 
crises must commit to a transition from the now-dominant culture of 
secrecy to a culture that encourages sharing and pooling of resources, 
particularly information.
2. Early and ongoing iterative inter-agency needs assessment focused on 
humanitarian concerns.  In a crisis in which humanitarian organizations 
have been on the ground for an extensive period prior to the arrival of 
other actors (e.g., an MNF), information sharing can get off to a 
productive start if newly-arriving actors begin in a “receive mode;” that 
is, asking questions about the requirements for provision of humanitarian 
assistance, security concerns, the existing political situation on the 
ground, etc.
3. At the operational level, establishment of a Civil-Military Operations Center 
under the auspices of the UN, complete with an online presence and an e-mail 
information distribution system is very helpful.  While there were some 
concerns that such a center would be an overly “passive” source of 
information, this operation would at least provide a clearinghouse and 
nexus -- both virtual and physical -- for sharing information among 
agencies.
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4. Also at the operational level, a commitment to neutrality in inter-agency
meeting locations.  This could mean sharing information at the SRSG 
headquarters or in neutral territory in neighboring countries. 
5. At the strategic level, inter-agency working groups headquartered at the United 
Nations, could be helpful in creating early and effective means of information
sharing among the various communities.
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JOINT PLANNING: Priorities, Insights and Recommendations
“ An essential aspect of this is enabling and 
facilitating NGO representation in the planning 
process. Facilitating NGO representation is essential 
because there will be reluctance on the part of some 
of the NGOs to spontaneously assume that they have a 
place at the table. ”
Participant Observation 
“ Humanitarian Operations During Conflict ”
For the purposes of the Aliya exercise, “Joint Planning” refers to successful inter-
agency cooperation in the planning of operations necessary for the delivery of 
humanitarian aid.  The term has a specific and different meaning to the armed 
forces.
JOINT PLANNING: MOVE I 
NOTE: During Move I, the Joint Planning group’s discussion tended to focus on the 
broader, less-game-specific issues relevant to planning in a complex environment. Thus, 
their conclusions and recommendations do not specifically address the hypothetical crisis 
in Aliya so much as the problems in humanitarian relief generally.
Participants began by establishing the principle that for a complex humanitarian 
emergency in a conflict environment, unity of overall effort is essential, but does 
not imply unity of overall command.  While the group agreed that information 
sharing is a necessary first (and ongoing) priority in order to facilitate effective 
planning, this observation highlights the critical importance of effective 
planning; once operations by various agencies are in motion, there will often not 
be time to sort out competing or overlapping priorities.  These questions must be 
resolved in the planning process. 
It was agreed that there are, ultimately, limits to the efficacy of joint planning; 
even in an ideal planning environment, organizations might not be able to meet 
their planned commitments.  Weather, belligerent actions, the scale of 
humanitarian need and other factors often intervene to complicate matters.
NGOs, as is true for all organizations, must confront the challenges of funding 
constraints, in which donor priorities and earmarks may not align properly with 
needs on the ground.  The clear solution is for NGOs to engage in continual 
planning and operational assessment to identify problems and make adjustments 
as events unfold.
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The group’s consensus was that the MNF should directly engage in relief 
activities only as a last resort and always in coordination with or at the request of 
the SRSG and/or Humanitarian Coordinator of the UN mission.  In some cases, 
mostly due to security threats or poor overall security situations, most NGO and 
IOs agreed that "joint" or "side-by-side" operations with the MNF providing
overall security or limited logistical support were necessary.  A priority for 
NGOs in complex environments is the preservation of their ability to engage in 
the planning process without encumbering their own operations or jeopardizing 
their image of neutrality.
An important component of the group's discussion focused on when and how 
joint planning could or should take place.  It was agreed that joint planning 
should take place throughout the operation as a continuing procedure, and that 
successful joint planning is open and transparent.  Successful joint planning will
take place in both physical and virtual collaborative environments at multiple 
levels (i.e., strategic/policy, operational and tactical -- on the ground).  Further, 
they noted that players will alter their roles as requirements change.
JOINT PLANNING: MOVE II 
The group began by addressing the assumptions that would shape game play, 
paying particular attention to circumstantial and operational aspects of the 
mission.  Their focus remained on saving lives and relieving suffering in Aliya.
The group reviewed the UNSC mandate that defined the mission of the MNF 
and agreed that the same essential roles carried over from Move I, while security 
concerns came to the fore.
Many participants pointed to the central importance of the USAID.  Through its 
funding authority and the assets of the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance and 
DART teams, USAID plays a central role in supporting humanitarian operations.
The group concluded that the US Department of State and the US Embassy 
would increase the pace of diplomatic interaction with the Northern Alliance,
recognizing it as the predominate political body in the country, and one with 
which relations were feasible.  The group concluded that the MNF would 
attempt to reduce instability throughout the country or at least in the most 
accessible areas first, and that they would insist on greater inter-agency 
coordination.  The group also concluded that security and logistics issues would
become a major concern of the MNF. Humanitarian organizations would then 
begin intensive "return planning" to areas in which they were denied because of 
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security concerns.  It is also likely that they would increase their advocacy for 
assistance and protection needs.
The group concluded that NGO/IOs would want to coordinate their activities
and share information through UN-led structures.  Lead UN players were 
identified as UNHCR, UNOCHA, WFP and the SRSG.  These organizations 
would want to expand their operational bases as security and overall access 
improved.  The political role the SRSG plays was highlighted as very important 
in facilitating the establishment of an overall stable environment, particularly 
through the SRSG's political efforts.
Priorities remained the same for this group, and would be "circular in nature, 
occurring concurrently, and complimenting each other."  It was agreed that joint 
planning, like the other tasks, is an ongoing process rather than a one-time push.
In any complex environment factors such as conditions, needs and personnel, 
among others are continually in flux at all levels (tactical, operational, and 
strategic).  NGO reps stressed repeatedly that joint planning must take place in a 
neutral setting.  It was agreed that this could be in a third country setting.  While 
many NGOs prefer to avoid any interaction with belligerents, the group 
concluded that all organizations should participate in some sort of collaborative 
joint planning and that interaction is crucial to the accomplishment of the overall 
humanitarian mission.   Still, the NGO neutrality that is critical to humanitarian 
missions faces very real threats from close association with military belligerents.
The group extensively debated the issue of neutrality as it applied to the 
military's involvement in humanitarian actions.  Generally, NGO/IO 
representatives believed that if an NGO became too entangled with the military,
then it would lose its neutrality.  Conversely, NGO/IO representatives indicated 
that if the military set out to do humanitarian operations, then such operations
should only be carried out in full consultation with the humanitarian 
community.  According to many participants, such coordination should take 
place between the MNF and the Humanitarian Coordinator for the mission.
Facilitators noted that armed forces representatives did not resist the proposed
restrictions on military activities related to relief supplies.  This was surprising 
because the armed forces sometimes provide humanitarian relief to enhance their 
“force protection” whereas humanitarian principles require impartiality.
Presumably, the requested “full consultation” with the humanitarian community 
is designed to conform MNF humanitarian relief activities to overarching 
humanitarian principles.  In a real-world situation, this issue would likely be 
more contentious than it was during game play. 
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JOINT PLANNING: MOVE III 
The participants began by establishing a common set of definitions and 
assumptions, and by coming to agreement on the parameters of the mission. 
Echoing perhaps the most common refrain of the entire Game, participants 
agreed that joint planning must be an iterative, ongoing process.  It was further 
noted that the more integrated the planning process and the earlier it begins, the 
more likely it is to succeed.  This group concluded that planning operations
should be directed by the UN (or by the lead nation in the coalition) in Aliya 
itself (a difference from the Move II group), with strong support from the SRSG.
It was generally agreed that planning must provide for both the transition from
the MNF to the UN force and, concurrently, for the reconstruction effort ahead. 
Integration of the Aliyan authorities, such as they are, and of new actors is 
essential.  Capacity-building becomes a concern as roles change and new needs 
are identified; thorough coordination through working groups is key. 
The priorities in Aliya remained largely consistent: human and food security, 
water and sanitation, education, health, livelihoods, return and reintegration of 
refugees/IDPs, reconstruction of certain key infrastructure (local water, 
electricity, roads, bridges), and reintegration of former combatants.  Contingency
planning during this phase is essential to plan for the likelihood that as 
circumstances change, some agencies will inevitably be unable to fulfill their 
planned commitments.  In the case of the MNF not being able to establish a 
secure environment, however, all actors must accept that operations will likely 
need to be scaled back.
As in the previous Moves, NGO representatives in Move III were concerned 
about the issue of neutrality.  These challenges are not easily overcome; NGOs 
require somewhat secure environments in which to operate, which places them 
in a position of dependence upon the guarantor of security, usually the police 
and armed forces of the host country, or an MNF or a UN force.  In situations in 
which NGOs and military forces are working closely together, NGOs must 
paradoxically distance themselves even further from the military.  NGO 
representatives generally view direct military engagement in humanitarian 
activities as a last resort.
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PERSISTENT CHALLENGES
In the Aliya crisis and more generally, planning relationships are complicated by 
a set of challenges identified by the group: 
1. Possible confusion about the nature of the mission.  Because of the sometimes-
competing priorities of the agencies involved in a complex 
military/humanitarian environment, the potential for different 
interpretations of the mission may arise.  The group agreed that, at least 
for the purposes of planning, humanitarian organizations must avoid a 
tendency to address root causes of the crisis and the violence in the 
country and remain focused on the immediate delivery of humanitarian 
aid.
2. The priorities and capacities of participating agencies vary widely. Further, the 
capacities of a given organization may be sufficient in the early stages of a 
mission but become deficient as the needs on the ground evolve.
3. NGOs face substantial threats to their neutrality if joint planning creates the 
perception that they are working in partnership with military forces.  These
threats often keep NGOs and other humanitarians away from the 
planning process, which creates confusion about needs and opportunities.
4. Classification of information by all organizations, particularly armed forces, 
inhibits effective planning. While the armed forces have a reputation for 
over-classifying, NGOs and other actors also keep much of their own 
information confidential. 
5. Some necessary resources may not be present on the ground.  Proper protocols 
for information sharing, material to provide appropriate security, 
personnel to facilitate necessary operations are often not in place as 
operations begin. 
6. Some required actors may not be present from the outset.  Ideally, the SRSG,
MNF leadership, US and other government officials will be on the ground 
and ready to begin planning at the same time.  This is rarely, if ever, the 
case.
7. If an armed force is operating primarily in the government-controlled 
sectors while NGOs must function in rebel-held areas, planning cannot be 
done on a national level.
8. Short-term planning often neglects long-term needs. This is counter to point 
one above and presents an on-going challenge to this type of operation. 
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POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS 
For purposes of illustration, the Joint Planning group created an organizational
document designed to clarify working relationships in the planning process 
(seen below).
While complex, the outline represents the group’s recommendation for an 
optimal joint planning structure in a complex environment such as Aliya.  The 
primacy of the United Nations as a neutral broker may seem obvious but must 
be consistently reinforced by representatives of all communities and at all levels
of the campaign: strategic, tactical and operational. 
Other potential solutions emerging from group discussions are as follows: 
1. Attention must be paid to the needs and abilities of organizations, and care 
taken to avoid human and institutional frustrations with the inability of 
certain organizations to perform all tasks necessary to the fulfillment of 
their missions. 
2. A planning process led by the United Nations and conducted in a neutral 
environment may decrease risks to humanitarian neutrality and allow for 
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more fully-integrated planning.  Some armed forces will need to adapt 
their own planning mechanisms and processes in order to effectively
participate in a joint planning process that is controlled by a non-military 
actor.  Military officials may have to consider attending meetings out of 
uniform, and humanitarian organizations may need to use intermediaries 
to transact some planning business. 
3. Early and repeated vetting of proposed operations can help identify 
roadblocks in a timely manner, allowing time for alternatives and 
solutions to emerge. 
4. Planning must be an ongoing, iterative process that is both forward-looking
and focused on the situation in real-time.
5. Planning in the early stages must proceed with the agencies at hand 
without unduly complicating operations for organizations yet to arrive at the 
table.
6. Regional priorities will vary, requiring careful and region-specific planning.
22
TASK DIVISION: Priorities, Insights and Recommendations
“ Anybody who has worked in the field knows that this 
is the case: You’ve got rules, regulations, standard 
operating procedures, all kinds of things at the 
headquarters level. You go one level down and there 
are guidelines, and you go a level down further and 
it’s just you and the guy at the checkpoint. You’re 
making your own rules, okay? It’s something that needs 
to be addressed.”
Participant Observation 
“ Humanitarian Operations During Conflict ”
TASK DIVISION: MOVE I 
Task Division participants were charged with working through issues related to 
the assignment of resources, personnel and materiel to the task of resuming 
humanitarian aid in Aliya.
The group’s discussions were characterized by what one facilitator noted was a 
(perhaps artificially) high level of consensus and corresponding lack of conflict 
about the issues at hand.  Armed forces representatives immediately identified 
the scenario as a humanitarian operation in which the military would play a
supporting role, and the group as a whole agreed.  Further, the group believed 
that the task division issues were straightforward.
Reinforcing an insight generated in other groups, the Task Division group found 
the question of information management and the use of information as central. 
Some participants noted that governments may not be able to be relied upon for 
true transparency during humanitarian operations, given their potential political
interests.  It was also made clear that transparency does not mean that all 
organizations should practice candor, particularly with news-gathering 
organizations, about the activities of other actors.  This is an issue that goes to the 
maintenance of impartiality on the part of NGOs.  As an example, NGO 
representatives explained that the US Department of Defense severely damaged 
the perception of NGOs as independent actors when it held briefings at the 
Pentagon about NGO activity in Iraq.  NGO representatives stress that the efforts 
of the armed forces should be described as “in support of” humanitarian activity
but not described as actively engaged therein.
Another concern relative to task division is language and institutional culture.
The armed forces’ use of the term “humanitarian” frustrates many NGO officials.
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They argue that all military activities are based on political interests, and are thus 
not humanitarian (impartial) in nature.
The ‘marketing’ of humanitarian aid by many organizations can be seen as 
damaging the integrity of the humanitarian effort.  For example, donors mark 
their in-kind donations with their names and logos.  UN agencies stamp their 
logos on the products they deliver.  The impact this has on the local population
and situation needs to be examined and the activities adjusted as necessary for 
the maximum benefit to the affected population.
Humanitarian workers are not, for the most part, trained in public speaking or in 
how to manage the media, one of several problems identified vis-à-vis
humanitarian organizations and public affairs.  Another principle concern: the 
most visible faces of the humanitarian community are sometimes celebrities (the 
singer Bono is a prime example) who do not represent humanitarian 
organizations in any official capacity, and while they bring a lot of attention and
money to humanitarian concerns, their priorities are often utterly unconnected to 
the funding priorities of humanitarian organizations. 
Of substantial concern to US armed forces representatives is the fact there are 
not, and perhaps never will be, enough US and foreign Civil Affairs officers to 
completely manage the civil-military interface.  Therefore, all of the armed forces 
actors should have some sort of orientation.  Examples were given describing 
situations where a low-ranking military officer may be in charge of a specific task 
related to public affairs but will not be aware of any overarching objectives to the 
activity.  Being educated on the purpose of the humanitarian assistance activities 
might lend credibility to the soldiers responsible for actually implementing the 
support tasks among the NGO community and result in improved combined 
efforts at the field level. 
Specific to the scenario at hand, the operation is clearly a humanitarian operation 
with a need for military support.  Therefore, humanitarians on the ground 
should take the operational lead.  While there was considerable skepticism as to 
the willingness of the armed forces to accept humanitarian leadership, armed 
forces representatives in this working group argued that under the scenario as 
described, the MNF would have no problem responding to the objectives and 
priorities identified by the humanitarian community.  Still, members of the 
group suspected that the US armed forces or their civilian leadership in 
Washington would be somewhat more circumspect in a real-world crisis.
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TASK DIVISION: MOVE II 
The humanitarian need in Aliya has drastically worsened in scope and 
geography.  Coupled with this, the humanitarian organizations are more 
restricted on where they can go and what type of activities they can perform.
Security is the biggest issue; threats thereto include local fighters and the 
US/MNF forces engaging the fighters.  The military mission has remained the 
same, but they are now reaching into the mandate more aggressively and using 
‘all means necessary.’
The group believed that the biggest constraint facing the humanitarian effort in 
this scenario would be the likelihood of limited information exchange.  The 
potential for dialogue between organizations to completely break down is high.
The MNF’s ability to continue to support humanitarian activities is also in 
question, given that it is now party to war.  To help alleviate this problem, a 
Coalition/Combined Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) should be 
established and required to provide up-to-date, continuous, relevant information
to the humanitarian community.  The group felt it was vital for humanitarian 
organizations to continue to share an open dialogue with the local population to 
ensure the highest possible transparency.  Humanitarians would need to 
continue to use local distribution structures even though the insecurity made it 
impossible for most international staff to be present.
Given that the priority for the MNF in this scenario was to bring the conflict to an 
end, humanitarian actors would have to further distance themselves from any 
direct association with the armed forces.  Logistically, there would still be 
collaboration; however, the preservation of NGO neutrality would 
simultaneously become dramatically more important and profoundly more 
complex.
Humanitarians would accept the armed forces providing required assistance in 
cases where lives would be saved and other options were unavailable. 
Participants expressed concern that pressure from the US Government would 
result in the MNF being pressed into a humanitarian-type role for public 
relations purposes.  This pressure may undermine the role of the humanitarian 
operators.
The group acknowledged that as soon as the MNF began combat operations 
against the belligerents, some IO/NGOs would immediately disassociate
themselves with the MNF.  This is a natural outgrowth of the culture of many of 
those organizations.  It has happened in the past, and essentially requires a 
redoubling of planning and communications efforts, in order to avoid a complete 
breakdown between communities.  It was noted that outside the country 
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dialogue and coordination of activities might well continue, while inside the
country many NGOs would avoid all contact with the MNF. 
The group assumed that the MNF would now deliver humanitarian aid directly 
to beneficiaries and, thus, the modus operandi of the IO/NGOs would change.
One solution suggested was in the form of a third-party arbitrator/mediator.  In 
this case, it would be the UN.  Armed forces representatives made it clear that 
even though they were still providing support to a humanitarian operation, they 
always had the right to decide which of the activities they would support.  NGOs 
cannot assume that their priorities will be supported to the degree and with the 
timing they might prefer.
The group felt that ‘hot button’ issues should be identified so that efforts are 
directed toward solving the most urgent issues instead of focusing on issues that 
are not problems.  The ‘hot button’ issues were loosely defined as those that 
would inhibit collaboration.
TASK DIVISION: MOVE III 
The primary task division challenge as identified by the participants concerns 
capacity-building for a country devastated by conflict, drought and a change of 
government.  In this new phase, humanitarian work will be just as critical as in 
previous Moves, but the nature of the work will change dramatically, as will the 
type and number of staff needed to carry it out.  The International Committee of 
the Red Cross, for example, will change its focus from Geneva Convention
conflict issues to family reunification, prisoner exchange and other post-conflict 
issues.  Many NGO activities will have been led by local staff, which may or may 
not change.
According to some participants, the immediate post-conflict period is the most 
dangerous period for humanitarian operations as a stable environment has not 
yet been established.  Embassies will increase their diplomatic activities, but 
government representatives stress that the US State Department would be 
reluctant to commit resources without a discernable potential for stability and 
democracy.  The transition will not be smooth and will require excellent 
coordination.  Gaps and overlaps in responsibility will occur throughout the 
process.
Task divisions will be dependent on capability of the international community to 
provide support and on the ability of the local community to receive it, which
presents numerous logistical challenges.  The international community’s 
willingness to provide resources will in large part be dependent upon local 
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participation and ownership of the rebuilding challenge.  This local “ownership” 
is critical to success; without a genuine commitment to the process from local 
authorities, security problems expand dramatically.
Given the experience of the Task Division group during Move III, the armed 
forces’ unwillingness to revert to a supporting role in the post-conflict period 
may present a challenge.  Representatives of the armed forces in this group 
expressed confidence that, given their efforts during hostilities, leadership in the 
post-conflict period would fall to them.  The group did not discuss this question 
in any depth, which the facilitator interpreted as unwillingness among members 
of other communities to challenge the armed forces representatives on this key 
question.
The group remained focused on the transition, a key component of which is 
managing expectations; participants stressed the importance for all agencies of 
avoiding promises that cannot be kept.  For example, humanitarian 
organizations should not offer assurances about security, nor the armed forces 
about aid, no matter how tempting it may be to do so.  When another 
organization fails to come through on a promise it did not make and may be 
unaware of, the credibility of the whole effort is jeopardized.  A solution might 
be to include all parties in control of assets to a meeting where public 
communications of this kind are addressed.
This was the first group where internal coordination within the US Government 
(i.e., both civilian and military) was discussed in detail and identified as, 
potentially, the biggest impediment to collaboration on the ground amongst the 
various communities.  Without internal US Government policy clarity the multi-
national inter-agency process is at risk. 
PERSISTENT CHALLEGES
The Task Division Group identified some of the challenges related to organizing
and executing complex humanitarian efforts as follows: 
1. NGOs generally lack the ability to train their staffs in working cooperatively with 
armed forces.  Most training is on-the-job and comes in the form of 
apprenticeships.
2. For all organizations, funding for task division training and procedures is 
sorely lacking.  Donors to humanitarian organizations tend to focus on 
operations, procurement and staffing.  Similarly, government policy-
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makers responsible for military funding do not allocate enough budgetary 
resources for civil-military training.
3. In cases where humanitarian and military forces must operate side-by-side,
indigenous public perception proves very difficult to manage.
4. Task Division consistently breaks down at the operational level, where armed
forces may find themselves performing tasks assigned to other agencies.
An example would be the delivery of humanitarian aid in military 
vehicles due to security or logistical needs. 
POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS 
The following solutions were suggested by the Task Division groups:
1. US armed forces have the resources to train and prepare staff for interagency 
activity.  These efforts need to be redoubled, and perhaps best practices
shared with other agencies (as is taking place under the auspices of this 
event).
2. Organizations, particularly NGOs, must integrate greater flexibility into their 
operational assumptions. When unanticipated complexities at the 
operational level force personnel into unconventional roles (direct military 
delivery of aid is the primary example), there must be contingencies and 
procedures in place to avoid potential consequences such as the loss of 
NGO neutrality.
3. NGOs must seek donor support for task division activities. The activities 
require dedicated staff with knowledge of operational priorities on an on-
going basis.
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CONCLUSIONS AND KEY INSIGHTS OF SUMMER GAME
The need for a genuine commitment to improved civil-military relations is clear.
Events such as this Game is an example of an educational tool that can be used to 
improve cross-community understanding. Improved understanding, in turn, can 
enhance opportunities for communication and collaboration, and the ultimate 
goal of addressing humanitarian needs in complex emergencies.
The success in Kosovo in the late-1990s is an example of the possibilities that 
emerge when inter-agency coordination is given the time and prioritization that 
it demands. 
Among the many key points and challenges identified throughout this report a 
few stand out as worthy of particular attention:
x The institutional bias, present among virtually all parties, against transparency 
and information sharing is striking; some participants referred to it as a “culture of 
secrecy.”  This “baggage” surely has some of its roots in prior experience.  It 
owes, in part, to the internal culture of some of the organizations
themselves. Additionally, some of it is due to the often profoundly 
divergent missions and identities of the many organizations involved in 
complex humanitarian environments.
x Most participants lamented that over-classification of information, 
reluctance to communicate transparently and latent mistrust have 
undermined cooperation.  Despite these factors, the opportunity for
enhanced communication and coordination between communities exists
and, participants insisted, with effort, a “culture of sharing” could emerge in 
their place.
x Many participants agreed that an early, sincere and often reaffirmed 
commitment to inter-agency planning was the key.  In addition to its status as 
a mission-critical activity, the joint-planning process has by-products that 
enhance other kinds of inter-agency activity.  Foremost among these is the 
development of inter-personal personal relationships.  Through in-depth 
and iterative education and training programs such as this Game, 
participants believed that an atmosphere of trust could emerge.
x Another challenge was the lack of donor and funding-agency awareness of the
operational needs on the ground in complex inter-agency activities.  For NGOs 
and international organizations, the need is for donor education and 
fundraising efforts focused on staff training and development related to 
planning, information sharing and related tasks. 
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x For government agencies such as the Department of State, USAID and the 
Department of Defense this requires educating officials about the ongoing 
demand for trained, dedicated staff and resources devoted to inter-agency 
activities.
x Neutrality and the perception of neutrality during inter-agency activity are of 
paramount importance to NGOs and IOs -- game participants pointed to the 
neutrality issue as in some cases an intractable one, but many believed that 
comprehensive information sharing and joint planning helps to ease the 
challenges.  To the maximum extent possible, organizations must work 
together without jeopardizing the perception of NGO neutrality.  This is of 
particular importance when international military forces are engaged as 
belligerents.
x Finally, given that organizational capacities vary widely across the different 
communities, and that complex humanitarian emergencies are dynamic, it 
is critical for all actors to remain flexible, aware and tolerant of the
strengths and weaknesses of the other actors in the field.
While all commitments will never be met as all parties might wish, and while
there is often disagreement about such basic questions as whether all actors are 
on the same side, there can be no mistaking that cooperation between the major 
parties is central to the completion of every organization’s mission.
“Humanitarian Operations During Conflict” demonstrates that through a 
commitment to transparency, flexible operational models, and iterative planning, 
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